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School productivity1 Collective wage setting is a feature of many education systems. For example, in the
USA, as of 1988, all but seven states had passed a law either allowing for the right ofThe importance of educationmeans teacher productivity, and the ef-
fect of pay on teacher performance, is a central concern for governments
worldwide. However, evidence on the subject is mixed (Hanushek,
2003; Hanushek, 1997). One reason for this is the difﬁculty in identify-
ing the true impact of teacher pay on performance due to the
endogeneity of teacher wages. Further, while experiments investigating
the impact of performance pay for teachers have been plentiful (e.g.
Woessmann, 2011), experimental evidence on the impact of teacher
pay levels is extremely limited. Instead, one must resort to exploiting
natural experiments in order to identify the impact.
One feature common to many teacher labour markets is the use of
wage setting at a higher spatial level than the school. While suchmech-
anisms avoid the cost of negotiation at school or district level, they also
have an effect on the wage structure for teachers, ﬂattening teacher
wages across heterogeneous labour markets so the variation that exists
does not fully reﬂect the wage differentials in the external labour mar-
kets in which teachers are employed (e.g. Duncombe and Yinger,
1998). The consequence is that teacher wages will be relatively worse
in areas where local labour market wages are high: effectively the
wage setting sets a ceiling on teacher pay. If pay matters for teaching,
teacher output will be lower where the wage ceiling bites harder. We
use this insight to test the effect of teacher pay on school performance.
Our research design exploits the centralised pay setting of over 200,000
teachers who teach around half a million children each year in theof Bristol.
).
. This is an open access article underEnglish public (state) school system and a national system of pupil test-
ing and assessment of school quality.
In England pay for teachers is set by a central review body that sets
pay scales in which there is very limited regional variation.1 However,
as regional pay differences are considerable in the private sector even
after controlling for human capital characteristics and other factors
(Bulman, 2002) this creates a gap between local labour market wages
and the regulatedwages paid to teachers.We use this to examine the ef-
fect of exogenous local wage shocks on the quality of schooling in all
public (state) secondary (equivalent to US middle and high) schools.
Our primary measures of performance are based on the performance
of pupils in the high stakes exams taken at the end of compulsory
schooling. We complement this by examining quality as measured by
in-depth assessments made by the national school regulatory body.
We use a data source on pupil performance that allows us to control
for the initial ability of the school intake, time varying attributes of the
school body and time constant pupil, family and neighbourhood charac-
teristics that may affect levels of attainment independently of teacher
effort. We examine some of the potential pathways by which wages
may results in greater pupil attainment including the cross-sectionalteachers to bargain collectively or explicitly requiring districts to bargain with teachers'
unions (Lovenheim, 2009). Wages are also centrally negotiated between the state or na-
tional government and the teaching unions in many European countries (Galgóczi and
Glassner, 2008).
the CC BY license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
2 LEAs are geographically coterminous with the primary and larger units of local gov-
ernment, the Local Authority (LA).Weuse the term LEAwhendiscussing education/school
issues and data and LA when discussing data available at this level.
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out that our ﬁndings are explained by pupil and parental, rather than
teacher, responses to wage shocks.
We ﬁnd a ten per cent shock to the gap between the local average
outside wage and the teacher wage results in an average loss of about
2% in the high-stake exams taken at the end of secondary school and a
5% loss in a key metric by which schools are assessed by the regulator,
the public and the government. The loss is greater in schools that are
located in areas where the ceiling bites harder and for schools that
have no control over the employment conditions of teachers. We ﬁnd
that a measure of teaching quality from inspections by the national
school regulator is lower where wage shocks are higher and that higher
outside wages are associated with lower lengths of tenure. The results
are robust to awide range of speciﬁcation tests, and to alternative expla-
nations relating to other channels through which the outside wage
might affect pupils' performance.
Our paper contributes to the large body of evidence on school per-
formance and the teacher labourmarket. There is the large and growing
literature on the impact of teacher pay on school performance. Research
on the effect of teacher salaries on school level pupil outcomes initially
suggested that this was mixed. For example, Hanushek, 2003, reports
that only 20% of 119 estimates found a positive effect of teacher wages
on school performance. But later research has found more response to
wages. For example, for the USA, Loeb and Page, 2000, ﬁnd teacher
wages to be a signiﬁcant determinant of pupil outcomes, estimating
that a 10% increase in teacher wages would reduce dropout rates in
the US by between 3 and 6%, while Hendricks, 2014, ﬁnds that paying
teachers more improves student achievement through higher retention
rates. Dolton andMarcenaro-Gutierrez, 2011,ﬁnds both relative and ab-
solute levels of teacher salaries exert an important inﬂuence on pupil
performance using data on 39 countries. Another focus has been the
impact of teacher pay on the labour supply of teachers, including
entry, duration of teaching,mobility of teachers and teacher absenteeism.
Examples include Murnane and Olsen, 1990; Dolton, 1990, 2006; Dolton
and van der Klaauw, 1995; Figlio, 1997; Barr and Zeitlin, 2010 and Leigh,
2012. All of theseﬁnd an effect, thoughHanushek andRivkin, 2006, stress
that teacher responses to alternative wages may be muted compared to
other workers. A separate strand in the education literature examines
the effect of differences in the educational cost across areas on perfor-
mance from the USA. This research makes the point that centrally deter-
mined ﬁnancing formulae, intended to help equalise ﬁnances between
areas have differential ability to raise funds (e.g. Duncombe and Yinger,
1998; Hoxby, 2001), may also have unintended consequences, for exam-
ple on student performance (e.g. Duncombe and Yinger, 2011; Eom et al.,
2007) and teacher attrition (Ondrich et al., 2008).
More generally, labour economists have long been interested in the
impact of labour market changes on ﬁrm performance. Theories of “ef-
ﬁciency wages”, for example, suggest that improvements in the labour
market outside theﬁrm's boundaries could lead to decreased productiv-
ity within a ﬁrm because there may be more shirking (Shapiro and
Stiglitz, 1984), a loss of high quality workers (Weiss, 1980) or percep-
tions of inequity (e.g. Akerlof, 1982; Mas, 2006). It is difﬁcult to test
these ideas in an unregulated labour market. Where pay is set by regu-
lation, however, there is a wedge between inside and outside wages
that enables identiﬁcation of the impact of external labour markets on
ﬁrm outcomes. So we can effectively use regulation to generate exoge-
nous variation in factor prices. In this design, two papers are anteced-
ents to ours. The ﬁrst is Cappelli and Chauvin, 1991, who show that
higher outside wages increase shirking in a US auto manufacturer.
Like our paper, the authors exploit the fact that the union contract stip-
ulates the same pay rates across diverse metropolitan areas. But their
sample is small and is a cross section of 78 plants, whereas we have a
much larger panel of around 3000 schools. The second, and closest,
paper is Propper and van Reenen, 2010, who examine the impact of
centralised wage regulation for nurses on death rates following emer-
gency admissions for heart attacks to English hospitals between 1996and 2005. They ﬁnd that the aggregate death rate rises due to the regu-
lation and that removal of centralised wage setting would have positive
welfare consequences. Our paper complements theirs by focusing on
another key part of state provision: the education of around 3 million
of England's children per annum.
The remainder of the paper is as follows. Section 1 outlines the
institutional background of education in the UK, Section 2 provides
information on the data used and Section 3 discusses themethodology.
The results and a range of robustness checks are given in Section 4.
Section 5 studies potential mechanisms through which the outside
wage could operate. Section 6 presents a simple calculation of the
potential gains from removing wage regulation and Section 7 offers
concluding comments.
1. Institutional background
Education in England is compulsory between the ages ofﬁve and six-
teen. While children can be educated privately, the public (state) sys-
tem dominates. State sector pupils attend primary school from age
ﬁve to eleven and secondary school from age eleven to sixteen. Pupils
can then stay on for a further 2 years to get qualiﬁcations that allow
them to undertake university level education. In 2007 approximately
three million young people (around 84% of eleven to sixteen year
olds) were attending public secondary schools. In each secondary
school there are ﬁve (or seven if the school provides education up to
18) separate age cohorts within the school at any one time.
Pupils take nationally set exams at four points during their ages of
compulsory school attendance. At primary school these are Key Stage
1 (KS1) at age 7 and Key Stage 2 (KS2) at age 11 (the year of exit), in
Mathematics, English and Science. In secondary schools these are Key
Stage 3 (KS3) exams at age 14 in Maths, English and Science and Key
Stage 4 (KS4) examinations in multiple subjects (typically between
eight and twelve) at the end of compulsory schooling at age 16. We
focus on KS4 (GCSE) examinations as our measure of school perfor-
mance as these are high stake examinations. For pupils they determine
progress into education after age of 16, as aminimumofﬁve pass grades
required to continue on to further education, are used by parents to
choose secondary schools for their children, by themedia to rank school
performance to create school ‘league tables’ and by local and central
government to identify ‘failing schools’.
Schools in England are heavily regulated by central and local govern-
ment. Summary statistics on school performance have been published
annually since the early 1990's. The key measure used to compare
schools has been the number of pupils attaining at least 5 good grades
in the KS4 exams (known as 5 A*-C GCSEs), though the number of met-
rics published increased during the mid- and late 2000's. In addition, in-
depth assessments of the quality of the school are undertaken by the
schools regulator, OFSTED. Each school is inspected roughly every ﬁve
years. Inspections often last several days. On the basis of these site visits,
OFSTED publishes a report rating the school's performance on numerous
dimensions, including an overall rating of the school and an assessment
of teaching and learning at the school. More details on these metrics are
provided below in Section 3.1.
1.1. Teacher pay in England
Teacher wages are set by Local Education Authorities (LEAs) based
on guidelines issued by the national Government Department for
Education.2 Despite the existence of four pay bands (‘Inner London’,
‘Outer London’, ‘The Fringe’ and ‘The rest of England’), teacher wages
have exhibited very little regional variation relative to private sector
wages since the early 1970's. For example, the average teacher wage
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proximately 15%, while the equivalent private sector wage differential
can be as large than 45%.3 Since its formation in the 1990's, the School
Teacher Review Body (STRB), an advisory board which comments on
teacher conditions and pay, has frequently argued that the Department
for Education should be doing more to encourage locally ﬂexible
wages.4 Although an increasing amount of discretion over wages has
been granted to LEAs, and more latterly schools, they have not utilised
the option (Sibieta, 2015). This is possibly due to the fact that local au-
thorities have faced strong national teaching unions for many years,
making the costs of local negotiations high for a single school or local
authority (Zabalza et al., 1979).5 Further these costs are incurred before
any gains are realised, so schools and the elected local authorities may
place greater weight on current costs versus longer-term potential
gains. In addition, there has been very little scope for schools to provide
differential non-pecuniary beneﬁts for teachers - there is no variation in
holidays and contact hours are generally ﬁxed.
Recent changes to the schooling system in Englandwhichhave come
into play in the second decade of this century have given schools poten-
tially more power over wages and teacher conditions. The UK govern-
ment has encouraged the setting up of ‘free schools’ and academies in
England. Such schools are free of LEA control and able to choose their
own curriculum. While the programme was started under the Labour
administrations which operated upto 2010, before the school year
2008–9 there were less than 100 such schools. The programme really
accelerated after 2010 (Sibieta, 2015). To avoid contamination we
conﬁne our analysis to before 2008 (we discuss the data in detail in
Section 3.1).1.2. How centralised pay may affect school performance
We followHall et al. (2008) and propose a simple dual-regionmodel
of the English market for teachers. In this market, ‘The North’ has lower
living costs and fewer outside options relative to ‘The South’. Evenwhen
controlling for worker composition, the local private sector wage is
therefore lower in the North. Because of these factors, for each given
wage, teacher supply is higher in the North than in the South. An ideal
pay structure would therefore allow differential wages in each region
to equalise supply and demand. As shown in Fig. 1, by setting the
centrally regulated wage to be constant across the two regions at WC,
even if on average the regulated wage is at equilibrium, a wedge exists
between it and the equilibriumwage at the regional level. In this model
the regulated wage acts as a pay ceiling in the South.
This model presents the case of an invariant regulated wage across
regions. In England there is some wage variation across four large
geographical regions but, as can be seen from Fig. 1, unless the regional
variation is such that the teacher wage in the South is set equal to WS
and the teacher wage in the North is set equal to WN, the nature of
the problem persists; disequilibria in local markets will remain, affect-
ing teacher supply in certain regions. Based on the lack of variation
that we observe in teacher wages compared with private sector wages
(and indeed the focus of the STRB on the issue), it is highly unlikely
that the regional variation in England goes far enough.
This model highlights the possibility of insufﬁcient supply in high
wage areas, but Fig. 1 would be unchanged if it were referring to the3 Author calculations from ASHE (for non-teacher wages) and the School Teacher Re-
view Body reports (for teacher wages).
4 STRB annual report (2010).
5 The number of teachers in state schools is around 438,000. The largest union, the Na-
tional Union of Teachers, has around 325,000membersmaking it the largest teaching union
in Europe. A second union covers most other teachers in school. Both unions strongly sup-
port national pay frameworks (e.g. their recent submission to the pay review body http://
www.teachers.org.uk/ﬁles/nut-supplementary-submission-to-the-strb-november-2014.
pdf; http://www.nasuwt.org.uk/consum/groups/public/@salariespensionsconditions/
documents/nas_download/nasuwt_010779.pdf).supply of quality teachers, or indeed the supply of effort of teachers;
in either case there would remain a shortage in the South as a conse-
quence of the invariant wage.6 This highlights that the effect of an in-
variant wage on school performance in high wage areas could work
through a number of mechanisms which relate to both lower effort
and the sorting of lower quality teachers to relatively lower paid
areas (Lezear, 2000). In terms of sorting, problems may arise in re-
cruitment and retention. First, in England, Dolton (1990) ﬁnds that
wages are an important factor in recruiting good teachers and Ma
et al. (2009) ﬁnd a negative relationship between relative teacher
wages and posted Local Authority level teacher vacancies. Second,
public sector wage increases in the UK have been shown to improve
the qualiﬁcations of new public sector workers (Nickell and Quintini,
2002), suggesting the negative effect may not be seen just through
vacancies, but also through reduced teacher quality. In terms of ef-
fort, teacher quality has been shown to be important for school per-
formance (Barrow and Rouse, 2005; Rockoff, 2004; Benton et al.,
2003; Rivkin et al., 2005; and for England, Slater et al., 2012) and
teachers have been shown to be adversely affected by lower quality
colleagues and by high turnover rates (Ronfeldt et al., 2011). There
is scope for reductions in effort in response to lower relative wages
as the nature of teaching in England means a large proportion of
the work is discretionary (time spent lesson planning, engagement
in after-school programmes, time invested worrying about particu-
lar children).
Two early English studies of school performance suggest that rela-
tive pay is important but neither test this hypothesis. Gordon and
Monastiriotis (2007) investigate neighbourhood and regional effects
on education performance and conclude that schools from some of the
most afﬂuent areas perform worst relative to expectation. They attri-
bute this to ‘crowding out’ of public sector activity in afﬂuent areas.
Zabalza et al. (1979) examine English secondary schools in the 1960s
and ﬁnd fewer qualiﬁed teachers and higher turnover rates in London
compared to the rest of the country and attribute this to the poor
relative wages in London.
2. Methodology
We examine the relationship between local wages and school level
productivity. Our main measure of school productivity is value added
by the school in key national exams at the end of compulsory schooling.
We exploit the fact that there are national exams taken by all students
immediately prior to secondary school entry to control for initial ability
of pupils. In a set of extensionswe also explore othermeasures of school
productivity.
Following Loeb and Page (2000), a simple education production
function for value added at school levelwhich considers the importance
of controlling for alternative labour market opportunities is:
yi;t ¼ α þ β lnWIi;t−1− lnWOi;t−1
 
þ ρyi;t−5 þ γ ′Xi;t þ μ t þ f i þ ϵi;t ð1Þ
where yit is the average exam score at school leaving age (Key Stage 4) for
school i at time t, and yi ,t−5 is the average exam score at entry into the
school at age 11 (Key Stage 2).Wt−1I is the inside wage,Wt−1O is the out-
side wage, X is a vector of controls at cohort (the year group), school
and Local Authority levels), μt is a set of time dummies and fi is a time in-
variant school ﬁxed effect.
In our case, the insidewage is the regulated wagewhich is set over a
large region (there are four in the whole of England, a country with a
population of around 53 million). The outside wage is estimated from
wages in the local labour market. The use of a one period lag in wages
in Eq. (1) is problematic in the context of school production in England,6 Propper and Van Reenen (2010) present a more complex two sector, two skills model
in which individuals can move sector or region.
Fig. 1. The Impact of Wage Regulation on Labour Supply.
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This has two consequences. First, since education is cumulative and ﬁnal
examination results will depend on the education a pupil received in all
of the years they attended the school, it is likely that there will be long
lags in the effect of the outside wage.7 Thus a regression with only one
lag in wages is likely to suffer from omitted variable bias. While in prin-
ciple we could estimate Eq. (1) with 5 lags of wages, in practise the out-
side wages in year t are likely to be not dissimilar to those in year t-1, so
identiﬁcation of the separate effect of each year's wageswill be difﬁcult.
Second, since teachers teach children across year groups, different year
groups within one school will be subjected to the same shocks. This is
likely to create high levels of serial correlation in the outcome data. In
Appendix B we examine the impact of these two problems. These esti-
mates show the problem of estimating a full dynamic model, but they
also conﬁrm that in our data there appears to be a negative relationship
between outsidewages and value added for almost all lags of thewages,
and that this increases over time.
Our solution takes into account that pupils are in secondary schools
for ﬁve years between entry and sitting KS4 exams. To get round the
problem that a shock in year t will affect all children in the school, we
restrict our estimation sample to have a ﬁve-year gap between each
school level observation of performance. This means there are no over-
lapping cohorts of pupils contributing to each school level observation,
thus reducing the impact of serial correlation across cohorts. To address
the potentially long lag structure, we impose the assumption of com-
mon effects in the lagged wages and estimate the effect of an average
outside wage, deﬁned over a ﬁve-year period (i.e. from t-1 to time t-
5). This has the additional advantage of averaging away some of the
noise in the annual wages. The model we estimate is:
KS4i;t ¼ α þ β
1
5
X5
k¼1W
O
i;t−k
 
−WIi;t−1
 
þ ρKS2i;t−5 þ γ ′Xi;t þ μt þ f i þ ϵi;t
ð2Þ
The explanatory variable of interest is the gap between the school
outside wage averaged over ﬁve years from t-1 to t-5 and the regulated7 In principle, there could even be an effect of wages prior to entry into school of the co-
hort if this affected the teachers that taught the school cohort (for example, if wages led to
staff leaving and the remaining staff being demoralised as a result).insidewage at time t-1. Thedependent variable is school levelmeanKS4
points obtained at time t for school i. KS2i,t-5 is the intake performance
(measured in the last year of primary school) of the pupils who take
their KS4 in year t. This boils down to regressing changes in exam scores
on changes in outside wages, keeping constant any relevant Xit and
baseline exam scores. Conditioning on the ﬁxed effects at school level,
this is like a difference-in-difference analysis. A disadvantage is that as
school performance data which contains both KS4 and KS2 scores is
only available from 2002 onwards we only have two observations per
school, in 2007 and 2002, matched to wage data starting in 1997. How-
ever, we have a large sample of schools, and the two observations per
school allow us to control for time invariant heterogeneity at school
level. The outside wages are estimated from local area data, so to deal
with this we bootstrap standard errors. Finally, as outside wages are
labour market variables and not school level variables, we cluster stan-
dard errors at the (larger) local labour market.3. Data
We use several sources of administrative data. At the core of our
analysis is data on school performance matched to data on the gap be-
tween local outside labour market wages and the regulated inside
wage. To test robustness and to examine the potential pathways by
which wage regulation may affect school output we augment this
with other data on the local labour market and teacher tenure. This
section describes our data: details of sources and the years we use are
provided in Appendix A, Table A1.3.1. School performance data
Ourmainmeasure of pupil performance at school level is taken from
the Pupil Level Annual School Census (PLASC). This dataset records the
performance of all pupils in national exams in all 3285 public (state)
secondary schools in England. PLASC began in 2002. We use data from
the inception of PLASC to 2007. We conﬁne ourselves to this window
to avoid any potential contamination from schools which operated as
academies (there were only 85 in 2007).88 As the large increase did not occur until 2011 (Sibieta, 2015) we can also rule out any
anticipation effects.
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one and a conventional maximumof around fourteen, in a range of sub-
jects including Mathematics, English language, English literature, Sci-
ence subjects, and History.9 KS4 exams are graded from A* to G, and
these grades are translated into points, such that an A* is worth eight
points, an A is worth seven, a B is worth six, and so on. We use the
total number of points that a student obtains (i.e. points from each
exam summed across all the exams they take), averaged at school
level, as our keymeasure of output of the school. To control for the effect
of pupil type (including effects of peers in the school),we control for the
attainment of the same cohort of pupils immediately before they en-
tered the secondary school.10 This is the pupils' average point score in
the KS2 exams, also from PLASC. KS2 exams are graded from 2 to 5,
and are taken in Mathematics, English and Science.11
In analyses of other measures of performance we examine the pro-
portion of pupils in the school who achieved 5 GSCEs at grades A*-C
or better; the average number of KS4 exams taken by pupils (all from
the PLASC dataset); and the number of pupils excluded from school
(from the Dept. for Education). We also use measures of school perfor-
mance derived from the in-depth inspections of schools undertaken by
the government schools regulator (OFSTED). OFSTED undertakes expert
in-depth inspection of each school to provide a published assessment of
the quality of each school. These assessments take place over a number
of days and are intended to ‘net out’ any pupil or parental effect. The
school's performance is rated on numerous dimensions, including an
overall rating of the school and an assessment of teaching and learning
at the school.12 Both are rated on a four-point scale from 1 (outstand-
ing) to 4 (inadequate). Given the frequency of inspections, these data
are available for only a sub-sample of the schools in our main analysis.
We use inspection data from 2002 to 2008.
In our analysis of pathways, we use data on teacher tenure at school
level from the School Workforce Census. This is a recently released ad-
ministrative dataset from which the proportion of teachers in a school
who are in post for less than a year, and the proportion that have been
in post for over 10 years can be extracted. It has only, to date, been re-
leased for 2010.3.2. Wages and employment data
Our key measure is the ‘wage gap’, speciﬁcally the difference be-
tween ‘outside wages’ and ‘inside wages’. Our ‘outside wage’ measure
is intended to measure the alternative private sector wage which
teachers could command. We deﬁne the outside wage for each school
as the average wage of all Local Authorities (LA) whose headquarters
is within a 30 km radius of the school. This circle around the school rep-
resents a ‘travel to work’ area (TTWA), in which teachers at the school
could seek alternative employment.13 In some areas, there are as
many as 45 LAs within this radius, whilst in many others there is just
one as LAs differ in geographic size. For schools where there is not a
headquarters of a LA within the 30 km radius (or the wage data is
missing for the LAs within that range) the nearest LA with wage data9 There is no ofﬁcial maximum, although taking more than fourteen is rare.
10 There are more primary schools than secondary schools so pupils in any secondary
school will be from a number of different primary schools.
11 PLASC links data at the pupil level over time. It was preceded by the Annual School
Census (ASC) which was at school level. KS2 scores were only available for primary
schools in ASC i.e. theywere not linked to the secondary schools that pupils attended. Thus
school level value added cannot be observed before 2002.
12 Schools are given an overall rating.Within this there are four categories (Achievement
& standards/Personal Development &Well-Being/Quality of Provision/Leadership &Man-
agement). Teaching and Learning is a subcategory of Quality of Provision. Pre-2005 a
7-point scale was used to rate schools and from 2006 a 4 point scale. As few schools re-
ceived above 4, we capped scores at 4 for comparability across time.
13 Propper and van Reenen (2010) use the same labour market deﬁnition for nurses in
England.is allocated to a school, provided that LA is within 60 km of the school.
If the nearest LA with wage data is outside that distance, the school is
excluded from our analysis.14
The local wage data are from the Annual Survey of Hours and
Earnings (ASHE) dataset, a 1% sample of all employees in Great Britain,
covering approximately 300,000 workers per year, sampled in April of
each yearwhich provideswage data at Local Authority level. The public-
ly available dataset contains average wages, split into manual and non-
manual, part and full time. As ourmeasure of outsidewageswe use (the
log of) the full time male non-manual hourly earnings.15 To construct
the lagged ﬁve-year average wage for each school we use the average
of outside wages from t-5 to t-1 for all LAs that fall into the TTWA of
the school. The ﬁve year gaps between our outcome observations in
Eq. (2) mean we use average wages from 1997 to 2001 and 2002–
2006. In robustness checks we use a more complex measure of outside
wages which corrects wages for local labour market composition. The
correction uses Labour Force Survey (LFS) as ASHE does not contain
the necessary data to make this correction.16 Details are provided in
Appendix B. Insidewages are from theDepartment for Education Teach-
er Pay and Conditions Handbooks.
For our ‘inside wages’, we use teacher wage data at the payband
level to avoid concerns over endogeneity.17 We use the (log of the) in-
side wage lagged for one year, so inside wages are for 2006 and 2001.
The results are robust to using contemporaneous inside wages (for
2007 and 2002). In analyses of heterogeneity we deﬁne large ‘outside
wage regions’ on the basis of the long run level of outside wages, as
measured in ASHE. We group the 10 Government Ofﬁce Regions
(GORs) in England into three (details in Appendix Table A2, Panel (A))
and assign each school to a single ‘outside wage region’.18 In extensions
to our main analyses, we examine the impact of outside wages and em-
ployment prospects for different groups (the youth labour market,
manual workers) in the outside labour market on school performance.
These wage and employment data are from ASHE.
3.3. Controls
The PLASC data contain information on the ﬁnal-year (age 16) com-
position of pupils. But our identiﬁcation approach means that results
with and without controls should give the same estimates and pupil
characteristics may be endogenous. So we initially present results
with no controls other than prior attainment. We then use a small set
of controls (those that we ﬁnd are associated with value added control-
ling for outside wages) to allow for the effect on the standard errors of
heterogeneity across pupil type. The controls we include are Key Stage
2 (KS2) scores, percentage of male students, percentage of students el-
igible for free school meals (FSM), and the percentage of severe special
educational needs students (SEN) We also use this set of pupil controls
to test the key identiﬁcation assumption in our design. We also include
school expenditure per pupil (EPP) to address the concern that wages
might differ between schools across different paybands, but that school
resources might not.19
3.4. Data description
Summary statistics for all variables we use are in Table A3. The table
shows the range of KS4 points across school is large, with a minimum14 The small distances in England mean only nine schools are dropped from the sample.
In robustness tests below we examine the impact of using different radii to deﬁne the
TTWA.
15 Our results are robust to use of male and female (separately) weekly wages.
16 We also use the LFS to derive counterfactual wages for our calculations of the costs of
wage regulation.
17 Speciﬁcally, we use the salary point M6 on the teacher pay scale as our inside wage.
18 Long run wages based on ASHE average non-manual full time weekly wages.
19 The results are little affected by this control.
Table 1
Cross Sectional Associations between wages and KS4 performance.
Year 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
Wage Gap −0.390** −0.220 −0.545** −0.620*** −0.464** −0.152
(0.193) (0.247) (0.243) (0.231) (0.220) (0.281)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
LEA dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 2964 2985 2998 3018 3019 3035
Dependent variable is school average KS4 score. Wage gap is the outside TTWA wage
minus the inside wage lagged by one year. Inside teacher wages vary at the teacher
payband level. Controls in all regressions for Key Stage 2 (KS2), %Free School Means
(FSM), %Male, %Severe Special Educational Needs (SEN) and Expenditure per pupil.
Sample sizes vary by years due to school opening and closure. Standard errors are robust,
clustered at TTWA level (of which there are 529 clusters) and bootstrapped with 1000
repetitions. They are reported in the parentheses. * signiﬁcant at 10% level, ** 5% level,
* 1% level.
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scores are in different units to KS4 and have a mean of just under 27.
The log of the outside wage, averaged for each school over a ﬁve-year
period, has a school level mean of 7.134, which equates to an average
salary of £29,524 per annum.20 The log of the inside wage has a mean
of 6.43 and on average the wage gap is 0.704. All variables, particularly
the wage gap, exhibit considerable within group variation, indicating
change over time within schools.
Table A2, Panel (B) shows the absolute growth in the (nominal) level
of wages by the three outside wage regions for the whole period cov-
ered by our data, 1997–2006. For the whole period, absolute growth is
highest in the high outside region at £12.2 K and lowest in the low
wage region at £8.4 K. In the ﬁrst sub-period, the growth is againmono-
tonic across the three outside wage regions. In the second sub-period,
the growth is highest again in the high outside wage region and very
similar in the medium and low wage regions. Given this, there is a
close mapping between the deﬁnition of broad outside wage region in
terms of long run levels of wages and a deﬁnition of outside wage
areas in terms of growth rates in wages.21
Table 1 presents cross sectional estimates year by year between the
(log of) the wage gap (lagged one year) and school average GCSE per-
formance. We include controls for mean KS2 scores at intake and local
authority ﬁxed effects. The estimates are the change in average GCSE
points per pupil associated with a 10% increase in the outside wage.
All the cross-sectional associations are negative, though not all are sta-
tistically signiﬁcant. The association is largest in 2005 at just over half
a GCSE point lost per student.3.5. Test of assumption that school ﬁxed effects can be differenced out22
The model we estimate is a model of value added i.e. we condition
on the prior attainment of the pupils who are in the school at age 16.
We assume that the school ﬁxed effects in Eq. (2) are ﬁxed over time
and so can be differenced out. This assumption may be violated for sev-
eral reasons. The most important of these is that the cohort of students
whose KS4 achievement is measured in 2007 is different from the co-
hort whose KS4 achievement is measured in 2002. This is particularly
a problem in our context if within school differences in cohorts are cor-
relatedwith changes inwages and different types of student different in
expected growth in achievement. We seek to overcome this, in part at
least, by deﬁning the outside wage as covering a large area compared
to a school. The travel to work area in our analysis is 30 km round the
school. Thus the wage we use is not the wage simply of workers who
live locally to the school. This means that the outside wage is less likely
to be ameasure of the wage of parents of the children in the school. We
also control for a number of observed characteristics of the children in
the each of the two cohorts.
However, we may be concerned that our design is not robust and
here we implement a direct test of our assumption that changes in the
outside are not correlated with observable changes in the school co-
horts. We regress, at school level, the initial level of the achievement
of the school cohort KS2i,t-5 plus the other covariates pertaining to the
school cohort, on the outside wage, controlling for school ﬁxed effects
and time dummies.23 We present results for all years 2002–2007 and20 Annual average salary calculated from the level of the school TTWA wage.
21 There is heterogeneity in growth rates in LEAs in the middle outside wage region. For
example, of the 30 LEAs (of a total of 148) which experienced the highest wage growth
1997–2006, 11 are located in the middle outside wage region. These LEAs are all outside
the areas given the highest uplilft by the by the teachers pay Review Body. The LEAs are
Halton, Blackpool, Bath and NE Somerset, North Somerset, Plymouth, Poole, Wiltshire, Lu-
ton, Cambridgeshire, Essex, Hertfortshire.
22 We are grateful to an anonymous referee formaking this issue clear and for suggesting
tests to address this. This section draws heavily on their help.
23 We focus on outside wages, rather than the wage gap, as the differential between
areas in regulated wages does not change very often. Thus any differences in the socio-
economic conditions of an area will be driven by differences in outside wages.also for 2002 and 2007 only. In our main estimates of Eq. (2), we use
two observations per school of value added. The dates of these are
2007 and 2002 and therefore the school level covariates we use in our
regression are 2006 and 2001. The results are in Table A4. The table pre-
sents the estimates of KS2i,t-5 and the other student characteristics we
use in themain results on the outsidewage alongwith the joint F-test of
all the covariates. Column (1) presents results for the whole period and
column (2) for 2002 and 2007. The results show that the F-tests on the
covariates in both columns are small and insigniﬁcant. In addition, none
of the student characteristics are signiﬁcant associated with the outside
wage across the two regressions.
It is possible that areas with highwage changes experience differen-
tial changes in school composition over the period than areas that had
lower wage changes. To examine this we repeat the analysis above,
but this time splitting the sample split into three groups according to
the growth in outside wages over the period.24 This split into three re-
gions according to wage growth rates has very close correspondence
to a split in terms of long run levels of wages. The results are presented
in columns 3–8 of Table A4. This shows that there is a little more asso-
ciation within ‘growth in outside wages’ regions between the pupil
characteristics and the level of wages, but even here only two of the F-
tests are statistically signiﬁcant at the 5% level. Further, the patterns of
association between changes in pupil characteristics and changes in
wages is not consistent across, or within, regions. For the highest
‘growth in outsidewages’ region, wage growth is associated with an in-
crease in the proportion of children with parental low incomes, asmea-
sured by eligibility for free school meals. In the lowest ‘growth in
outsidewage’ region, an increase inwages is associatedwith a fall of pu-
pilswith special needs,whichmight also be taken as amarker of lowpa-
rental income. But in this region a growth in wages is also associated
with a fall in performance in the exams taken immediately prior to
school entry (Key Stage 2).253.6. Tests of common trends
Our analysis is essentially a difference-in-difference (DiD) estima-
tion in which we have multiple areas and two years per school. To
check our common trends assumptions we regress the growth in24 The wage regions split by the growth, rather than the level of outside wages differ
slightly, though there is a high correlation. By levels, the wage regions are, High: Inner
London, Outer London, South East;Medium: East SouthWest, NorthWest; Low: EastMid-
lands,WestMidlands, North East, Yorkshire. By growth, they are, High: Inner London,Out-
er London, North West, Yorkshire; Medium: West Midlands, South East, East Midlands;
Low: South West, North East, East.
25 This pattern of association also makes the direction of bias difﬁcult to sign. On one
hand, falls in KS2 may indicate that the pupil body is becoming more difﬁcult to educate
as wages rise and our results will be biased away from zero. On the other hand, falls in
thenumber of studentswith special needsmay indicate the student body is becoming eas-
ier to educate, so our results will be biased towards zero.
Table 2
School Productivity.
Key Stage 4 Five or more A*-C
OLS FE FE
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6]
Wage Gap −0.471** −0.475*** −1.115** −1.032** −0.273*** −0.247***
(0.185) (0.183) (0.448) (0.455) (0.090) (0.090)
KS2 0.464*** 0.454*** 0.215*** 0.196*** 0.047*** 0.042***
(0.007) (0.009) (0.018) (0.019) (0.003) (0.003)
Controls No Yes No Yes No Yes
School FE No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
No. Schools 2949 2949 2949 2949 2949 2949
N 5898 5898 5898 5898 5898 5898
Key Stage 4 mean is the dependent variable for columns [1]-[4], Five A*-C is the dependent variable in columns [5] and [6]. All regressions have 2 observations per school, with the school
outcome in 2002 and 2007. Controls in all regressions for Key Stage 2 (KS2), %Free School Means (FSM), %Male, %Severe Special Educational Needs (SEN) and Expenditure per pupil.Wage
gap is averaged TTWAwages overﬁve years (the “outsidewage”), laggedbyone year (i.e. 1997–2001 and2002–2006)minus inside teacherwages laggedbyone year (i.e. 2001 and 2006).
Inside teacherwages vary at the teacher payband level. Standard errors are robust, clustered at TTWA level (ofwhich there are 529 clusters) and bootstrappedwith 1000 repetitions. They
are reported in the parentheses. * signiﬁcant at 10% level, ** 5% level, * 1% level.
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characteristics of school pupils (jointly) in 2002 and the level of total
KS4 points per pupil in 2002 (the earliest year for which these data
are available). Differences in outside wage growth that are associated
with the initial level of covariates or school output could indicate that
areas that differ in terms of wage growth also differ in terms of unob-
servables and threaten our identiﬁcation strategy. The results are pre-
sented in Appendix A, Table A5 columns [1] and [2]. The results show
that there are no signiﬁcant associations between the 2002 characteris-
tics and the subsequent wage growth at LEA level.
While the baseline school covariates and school level average GSCE
points are not available before the release of PLASC in 2002, there is
available data on the performance at school level on the 5 A*-C metric.
As a further test, we examine the association between this metric in
1997 with subsequent wage growth 1997–2006. This therefore spans
the full period covered by ourwage data (as our analysis uses wages av-
eragedover 5 years, laggedonce). The results are presented inAppendix
A, Table A4, column [3] and show no association between baseline per-
formance andwage growth. The subsequent columns of Table A4 repeat
these analyses at the level of the three outside wage regions. Again, we
ﬁnd no association between baseline covariates or baseline school per-
formance and subsequent wage growth. We conclude that our design
assumptions are likely to be satisﬁed.27 The increase in estimates between OLS and the ﬁxed effects speciﬁcation suggests an4. Results
4.1. Baseline results
Table 2 presents estimates of the effect of wages on school produc-
tivity as measured by value added on KS4 test scores. Standard errors
are robust, clustered at the TTWA level and bootstrapped to allow for
the estimation of outsidewages.26 Columns [1] – [4] presents the results
for value-added (total exam points per pupil controlling for initial in-
take scores). Columns [5] and [6] present results for the percentage of
pupils who achieved at least 5 A*-C GCSEs (also with controls for initial
intake scores). Columns [1] and [2] present OLS estimates. The remain-
ing columns present ﬁxed effects estimates. The ﬁrst of each pair of es-
timates has no controls and the second includes those pupils and school
level covariates which are associated with test scores after controlling
for school ﬁxed effects and prior attainment.
The table shows all coefﬁcients on the wage gap are negative and
signiﬁcant. The increase in size between the OLS and ﬁxed effects esti-
mates in Columns [1] and [2] indicates that controlling for omitted26 We have almost 3000 schools and more than 500 clusters (TTWAs).school level factors is important.27 On the other hand, the effect of
controlling for time varying school level covariates is small, supporting
the appropriateness of our identiﬁcation strategy, as if this is correct
the covariates should only affect the standard errors.
The coefﬁcients represent the estimated change in the outcome as-
sociated with a 10% increase in the gap between the ﬁve-year outside
average wage and the inside wage. Column [4] indicates a loss of ap-
proximately 1 GCSE point per pupil in value added in response to a
10% increase in the wage gap, which is equivalent to dropping one
GCSE grade in one subject or around a 2% average fall at the mean of
44 points. Column [6] indicates a fall of around 2.5%age points in the
proportion of pupils achieving 5 or more A*- Cs, which equates to a 5%
fall at the mean of 56.5 percent. Thus the estimates suggest that a posi-
tive shock to outside wages leads to a small, but non-trivial, fall in both
measures of school productivity.
We now subject our results to a battery of tests. We begin by testing
the robustness of the results to the deﬁnition of our key variable, the
outside wage. We then allow for correlation of errors across schools
within labour market areas. We then test the salience of our design by
examining whether the effects of regulation are larger in various set-
tings in which the wage ceiling should have greater bite. Finally we ex-
amine robustness of the results to potential gaming by schools that may
be correlated with the outside labour market shocks.
4.2. Alternative speciﬁcation of the outside labour market
Our primary speciﬁcation uses the average of the one year lagged
gap between the (ﬁve year averaged) non-manual male outside wage
for a TTWA deﬁned as 30 km round the school and the regulated (in-
side) wage. We subject these key measures to a number of robustness
tests. First, in the spirit of a placebo test, we check that there is less
response to a less relevant measure of outside wage. As teachers are
graduates, if the outside wage has an effect on their performance, they
should be less likely to respond to shocks to the wages of less skilled
workers. In row [2] of Table 3 we replace the non-manual wage with
the wages of less skilled workers (manual workers). We ﬁnd the coefﬁ-
cient on thewage gapmore or less halves and is insigniﬁcant at conven-
tional levels.
Second, we check robustness to the deﬁnition of the TTWA. Our
main speciﬁcation uses a radius of 30 km round each school to deﬁneunobservable factor that is positively correlated with both outside wages and school per-
formance. An example might be a board of governors (the quality of the board of gover-
nors could be greater in high outside wages, improving school performance), or the
quality of the head-teacher, whose wages are not subject to regulation.
Table 3
Robustness Checks.
FE estimate
on wage (se)
[1] Baseline Estimate −1.032** 5898
(0.455)
Wage and labour market tests
[2] Manual wage gap −0.529 5898
(0.389)
[3] Wage gap −0.863* 5898
(0.448)
+ Employment of 25–49 year olds 0.737 5898
(0.633)
[4] Outside wages only −0.979* 5898
(0.551)
[5] Wage gap, inside wage corrected for teacher
composition
−0.929*** 5898
(0.351)
[6] Conley standard errors (TTWA Level) −0.895** 5898
(0.435)
[7] Without KS2 −1.197*** 5898
(0.454)
School gaming
[8] Exclusions as dependent variable 0.124 60
(0.474)
[9] Number of exams taken as dependent variable −0.162*** 5760
(0.063)
KS4 school performance is dependent variable unless stated otherwise. Controls in
all regressions for Key Stage 2 (KS2), %Free School Means (FSM), %Male, %Severe
Special Educational Needs (SEN) and Expenditure per pupil. Row [8] estimated at
GOR level with GOR ﬁxed effects. Standard errors clustered at TTWA level (of
which there are 529 clusters) and bootstrapped with 1000 repetitions (unless stat-
ed otherwise). They are given in the parentheses. * signiﬁcant at 10% level, ** 5%
level, * 1% level.
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aminimumof 10 km to amaximum of 120 km. The estimated wage co-
efﬁcient for each radius and the associated 95% conﬁdence intervals are
plotted in Fig. 2. This ﬁgure clearly shows the results are insensitive to
the precise choices of the radius for distances between 20 and 60 km.
Larger areas cannot really be considered to be a TTWA for a school
andwe also ﬁnd no effect at the very small radius of 10 km. It is possible
at this small radius wages are endogenous; we return to this below in
Section 5.3.28
Third, outside employment prospects may matter as well as wages.
At the very least, if employment falls, average wages rise due to compo-
sition effects. To check whether this impacts on our results we add the
employment rates of 25–49 year old at the local authority level over
the 5-year period for which the cohort is in school as an additional con-
trol. Row [3] shows that the coefﬁcient on the wage gap falls a little but
remains signiﬁcant at the 10% level. The coefﬁcient on the employment
rate is insigniﬁcant.
Fourth, our model is driven by the difference between inside and
outside wages. The inside wage at school level may be endogenous if
schools try to circumventwage setting. To test this we omit the regulat-
ed wage and estimate the effect of only the outside wage. The results in
row [4] indicate that the coefﬁcient on the outsidewage is actually very
little different from that on the wage gap in our baseline estimates in
row [1], though inclusion of the regulated wage improves the precision
of our estimates. This suggests that the average school was not able to
the circumvent wage regulation.2928 This smaller coefﬁcient is not due to the reduced sample size as the coefﬁcient with
the same set of schools as in the 10 km regression but with a TTWA radius of 30 km is
−1.389 (s.e. = 0.597). In further analyses we weighted wages by the inverse of the dis-
tance from the school to each LA headquarter used in the construction of the wage. This
did notmaterially alter the results. The results are also not sensitive to howwe treat assign
wages to schools that have no Local Authority whose headquarters lie within a 30 km ra-
dius (available from the authors).
29 In Table 4 belowwe follow this up by examining those schoolsmost likely to be affect-
ed by the regulation.Fifth, we use a more sophisticated measure of outside wages that
creates an area- and time-speciﬁc outside wage for teachers using
the observed characteristics (age, gender, years of schooling, etc.)
of teachers in a particular area-year cell (we do not observe these
characteristics at the school level).30 The results in Row [5] show
that this has little effect on the estimated wage coefﬁcient. Examina-
tion of the adjusted wage series shows that the difference in charac-
teristics between teachers and those working in other sectors does
not vary greatly over time in an area (available from authors).
Thus the main cause of area-speciﬁc time-series changes in the
wage gap is simply the growth in the non-manual wage in an area
rather than changes in observables or the price of these observables
over time. This supports our use of a measure that does not adjust for
composition.
Sixth, there may be common unobserved shocks to wages at the
local geographical level (the TTWA). To allow for this, we use spatially
correlated standard errors as in Conley (1999). Row [6] shows the esti-
mates remain signiﬁcant at the 5% level.
Finally, wage changes in an area may lead to school composition
changes, both at intake at age 11 and during the 5 years in the run-up
to Key stage 4 exams if children change school between the ages of 11
and 16. We go some way to picking this up by controlling for KS2 and
other characteristics of the school cohort who sit the KS4 exams. But
there may remain unobservable time-varying changes in the school co-
hort which we cannot control for with school ﬁxed effects (as they are
not time varying) or may not control for with the cohort level time-
varying measures of initial ability (KS2 mean) and other pupil charac-
teristics. Estimates without controls for KS2 provide some indication
of whether unobservable changes in ability might affect our results. In
Row [7] of Table 3 we present results without controls for KS2. These
are about 20% higher than our baseline estimate. This suggests that if
an increase in wages is negatively correlated with changes in unob-
served post-intake ability of the school population, our estimated effect
may be a biased upwards. On the other hand, if changes in post-intake
unobserved ability are positively correlated with shocks to wages,
then our estimates will be biased towards zero. Arguments can be
made for both a positive correlation (parents can buy more goods to
complement schooling) and a negative one (parents who have an in-
come shock substitute towards paid work and have less time to super-
vise their children).
4.3. Tests of the salience of our research design
Our argument is that pay regulation acts as a ceiling and we exploit
this to identify the impact of pay on school productivity. However, we
do not observe what the unregulated wage for teachers would
be. While it is difﬁcult to estimate the exact counterfactual wage for a
teacher in the outside labour market (see Ma et al., 2009, for one
approach) evenwithout observing this counterfactualwe should expect
to ﬁnd more effect where the ceiling is more likely to bite. This is in
labour markets where outside wages are highest and where schools
have least power over wage setting and conditions of employment.
To compare the effect of an outside wage shock across heteroge-
neous outside labour markets we estimate the response to an outside
wage shock separately for schools in each of the three ‘outside wage
regions’. The results presented in Table 4 showamonotonic relationship
between the wage gap and reduction in value added. Column [1] of
Table 4 shows a negative interaction term for the highest wage region.
Column [2] shows a positive interaction term for the lowest wage
region. Column [3] presents estimates for each outside wage region
separately. These conﬁrm the results of the previous two columns: the30 This follows Propper and Van Reenen (2010) who use this approach to construct a
wage which corrects for labour market composition appropriate to nurses. Construction
details in Appendix B.
Table 4
Tests of salience of research design.
Regional Heterogeneity Excluding London Only Schools with
No Control over Wages:
KS4
Only Schools with
No Control over Wages:
5A*-C
[1] [2] [3] [4] [6] [7]
Wage gap −0.752* −1.213*** −1.127** −1.372*** −0.321***
(0.428) (0.017) (0.555) (0.519) (0.108)
HW*Wage gap −0.850** −1.407***
(0.345) (0.488)
MW*Wage gap −1.051**
(0.445)
LW*Wage gap 1.320*** 0.130
(0.400) (0.567)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
No. Schools 2938 2938 2938 2609 1825 1825
N 5976 5976 5976 5218 3650 3650
All regressions have 2 observations per school, with the school outcome in 2002 and 2008.Wage gap is the average TTWAwage over ﬁve years (the “Outside wage”), lagged by one year
(i.e. 1997–2001 and2002–2006),minus inside teacherwages lagged by one year (i.e. 2001 and2006). Inside teacherwages vary at the teacher payband level. Controls in all regressions for
Key Stage 2 (KS2), %Free School Means (FSM), %Male, %Severe Special Educational Needs (SEN) and Expenditure per pupil. The results are robust to alternative deﬁnitions of the wage
regions. The exclusion of London excludes all schools in inner or outer London. Schools are deﬁned as facing high local competition if more than 8 schools within a 10 km radius. Schools
with no control overwages are ‘Community’ secondary schools. Standard errors robust and clustered at the TTWA level (of which there are 529 clusters), and are bootstrappedwith 1000
repetitions. They are given in the parentheses.* indicates signiﬁcant at 10% level, ** 5% level, * 1% level.
33 The tests in Table A4 show some association of observables with wage growth within
the different wage growth regions. Given the patterns in the table, unobservables which
are positively correlatedwith the observable covariatesmight bias in thewithin region es-
timates presented in section IV.D For example, if a rise in children with free school meals
indicates the pupil body is more difﬁcult to educate, then would give an upward bias to
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Fig. 2. Coefﬁcient estimates for KS4 from wages estimated at different sizes of Travel to Work Area.
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lation bites hardest and to not affect it where the wage gap is small.31
These results ﬁt with the pattern in regional wage changes thatwere
discussed in Section 3.4.While London and the South East may have the
highest long run level of outside wages, our estimates recover a re-
sponse to shocks to outside wages. These have been largest in the
high ‘outside wage’ region but they also have arisen in several labour
markets located in the middle ‘outside wage’ region. For example, of
the LAs in the top quartile of highest wage growth in our period, 35%
are in the middle ‘outside wage’ region. For these LAs our estimates of
the counterfactual wage (what would be paid in the absence of regula-
tion) is £1750 higher than the regulated wage.32 Thus wage regulation31 Estimates for the 5 A*-Cmargin also showa similar pattern: the coefﬁcients are−1.53
(0.66), −1.42 (0.64) and −0.62 (0.69) in the high, medium and low wage regions
respectively.
32 For method of estimation of the counterfactual wage see Appendix B.bites in the middle, as well as the highest wage area, and we ﬁnd a re-
sponse towages in both.33We also check that our results are not driven
by London schools. Column [4] of Table 4 omits all London schools and
shows are results are not ‘a London effect’. The point estimate of a
wage shock for such schools is around 30% higher, though the difference
with the full sample is not statistically signiﬁcant.our results in high outside wage regions. If a fall in the number of pupils who have special
needs indicates that the pupil body is easier to educate, this will bias our results for low
wage regions downwards. However, provided the direction of bias is small (perhaps sup-
ported by the fact that controls for observed school level covariates have little effect on the
estimates) this will not alter the overall pattern that the impact of wages is largest where
the wage gap is lowest.
84 J. Britton, C. Propper / Journal of Public Economics 133 (2016) 75–89We would expect a larger effect for schools which have least power
over their terms and conditions of employment. Other schoolsmight try
to circumvent the regulation in a way that would lead to a smaller im-
pact of the wage gap for such schools. In England, secondary schools
are classiﬁed into a number of types, the most common being Commu-
nity Schools. These schools are not permitted to select pupils and LEAs
have control over their curriculum and teacher wages. In the other
types of state schools pupil selection is sometimes an option (for exam-
ple, publicly run religious schools) and there is, in theory at least, more
ﬂexibility in terms of teacher wage setting. In columns [5] and [6] we
present the estimates for Community Schools only. Column [5] is for
KS4 results and column [6] for the 5A*-C proportion. The magnitude of
the coefﬁcient increases in each case by around 30% compared to the es-
timates for all schools. These results provide support for our argument:
there is a stronger effect amongst schools with the least (no) power
over their wage setting which is where the gap will bite hardest.344.4. School gaming
KS4 exams are high stake exams, not just for children, but also for
schools. This may lead to school gaming and if this is associated with
higher wage growth it could bias our results. By looking at both a mea-
sure of average performance (adjusted for intake) and performance on
the key 5 A*-C metric, which matters most for lower ability students,
we look at performance at different parts of the ability distribution. So
if gaming only affects the performance of low or high ability students,
our approach should deal with this.
But to further investigate this we ﬁrst consider whether schools sub-
ject to wage shocks try to prevent children from sitting exams by ex-
cluding them. We can examine this only at regional (the 10 GORs)
level due to lack of published data on exclusions at the school or LEA
level.35 The results of a regression of wage shocks on exclusions at the
regional level are presented in Table 3, row [8]. This shows no relation-
ship between the outside wage and the number of exclusions, suggest-
ing schools do not react to wage shocks by baring pupils from exams.
Second, it is possible that schools react to outside wage pressure by lim-
iting the number of exams that pupils take in order to get better average
performance. To examine this we re-estimate our baseline model using
the average number of exams taken as the dependent variable. The
results in row [9] show that schools do respond at thismargin: a 10% in-
crease in the outsidewage causes schools to reduce the average number
of exams taken by each pupil by just over 0.16. They may be doing this
to hit the key 5 A*-C metric. However, as Table 2 shows, this strategy
does not appear to prevent them from having lower performance on
this metric. But it may mean that our results are under-estimates of
the impact of the outside wage: schools subject to shocks may divert
more of their effort to hitting the targets at the expenses of higher scores
above the target.36 We conclude that while wage shocks may induce
schools to game, gaming does not drive our results. Schools subject to
wage shocks do not exclude pupils to avoid poor performance and
while they reduce the number of exams their pupils take, wage shocks
still negatively affect performance at both the high end (students who
take many exams) and at the lower end (those students aiming for
the 5 A*-C minimum) of the ability distribution.34 An alternative interpretation is that estimates which include schools which have
greater ability to circumvent thewage regulationwould bemore likely to suffer frommea-
surement error, which would give downward bias to the estimates which included these
schools. However, resultswhichomit the insidewage (which is the source of themeasure-
ment error) have the same pattern: schools which are least able to circumvent wage reg-
ulation have a more negative wage effect.
35 Data from the Department for Education, which provides exclusion data at GOR level
only.
36 We undertook further sensitivity tests, to which our results were robust.We excluded
KS4 outliers; the coefﬁcient (se) rose slightly to−1.192 (0.458). Our results are also ro-
bust to exclusion of small school cohorts (less than 30 students), so addressing potential
problems in measurement of school outcomes (Kane and Staiger, 2002).On the basis of this battery of tests, we conclude that our identiﬁca-
tion strategy is robust. School performance is decreased by positive
shocks to wages in the local labour market, there is an effect for both
high and low ability pupils, and the effect is stronger where the wage
ceiling has more bite.5. Mechanisms
Our argument is that shocks to outside wages can drive teacher
effort (through an efﬁciency wage effort) and labour supply (the loss
of good teachers) and that this lowers the quality of teaching. But it is
possible that the results are not due to responses of teachers but are
driven by responses of pupils and their parents to outside market
conditions.
Whilewe cannot rule this out completely,we provide descriptive (as
it is mainly cross-sectional) evidence on this by examining ameasure of
teacher quality that should not be affected by pupil type, so shutting
down a pupil effect; we directly examine the relationship between
wages and teacher tenure to see if schools subject to wage shocks expe-
rience problems with teacher retention; and we examine whether the
plausible responses of pupils to outside labour market conditions
drive our results. Finally, we discuss evidence relevant to parental
behaviour.5.1. The effect of wage regulation on quality of teaching
One way to examine the effect between wages and quality of teach-
ingwould be to examine the qualiﬁcations of teachers. However, teach-
er qualiﬁcations are not likely to be a useful margin. First, research on
teacher qualiﬁcations suggests there is little correlation between teach-
er qualiﬁcations and teacher effectiveness (e.g. Rockoff, 2004, Rivkin
et al., 2005, Aaronson et al., 2007, for the USA and Slater et al., 2012,
for England). Second, in the LFS data, most teachers are graduates and
this ﬁgure does not vary systematically across regions.
Insteadwe examine a directmeasure of the effectiveness of teaching
in the school: the ratings the school received in their OFSTED inspection
of school quality between 2003 and 2008. This measure should be less
contaminated by unobservable (to us) attributes of the student body
as the regulator ratings are based on in-depth inspections of the school
carried out by experienced educators. School performance is rated on a
number of dimensions, each using a four-point scale which ranges from
1 (outstanding) to 4 (inadequate).37 In Table 5, column [1] we examine
the relationship between overall performance of the school and outside
wages and in column [2] we examine the relationship between the
‘quality of teaching’ score and outsidewages.38 We use the same lagged
ﬁve-year average deﬁnition of outside wages and include pupil charac-
teristics for the year of observation as in our baseline model. As there is
only one observation per school we do not include school ﬁxed effects
but instead include LEA ﬁxed effects.
The results show that a larger wage gap is associated with a poorer
overall rating of the school (a positive coefﬁcient indicates an increase
in wages is associated with poorer performance). More importantly, it
is also associated with poorer teaching quality. A 10% increase in the
local labour market wage decreases the quality of teaching by 1.4
points.39 This is a large effect: the mean teaching quality score is 2.6 so
this is a fall in the teaching quality score of over 50% at the mean.37 There was a change in 2006 in the exact deﬁnition of the teaching quality component
of the assessment from ‘teaching’ to ‘effectiveness of teaching in meeting learners needs’,
so we demean the scores within year.
38 The inside wages are subsumed into the LEA ﬁxed effects
39 Due to the change in the teaching quality variable in 2006, we also estimate the effect
pre- and post-2006 separately. The coefﬁcient (se) on the lagged average wage for 2003–
2005 is 1.63 (0.331) and for 2006–2008 is 0.597 (0.327).
Table 5
Analysis of Pathways.
REGULATOR ASSESSMENT STAFF TENURE YP WAGES YP UNEMP
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6]
Dependent var.: Overall School
Rating
Teaching Quality
Rating
Proportion of Teachers b1
Year
Proportion of Teachers N10
Years
School KS4
Score
School KS4
Score
Wages 0.689** 1.459*** 0.300*** −0.339**
(0.340) (0.249) (0.116) (0.138)
Local 16–25 Wages −0.033
(0.027)
Local 16–25 Unemployment 0.184
(0.228)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Dummies No No No No Yes Yes
LEA dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes No No
School dummies No No No No Yes Yes
Years (dep var) 2003–2008 2003–2008 2010 2010 2004–2008 2004–2008
N 4567 3181 2680 2680 11,904 11,420
In Columns [1] and [2] dependent variable is OFSTED rating and thewage is “Wage gap”, i.e. the average TTWAwage over ﬁve years (the “Outsidewage”), lagged by one year,minus inside
(teacher)wages lagged by one year. In Columns [3] and [4] the dependent variable is the proportion of teachers in a schoolwith tenure b1 year, and N10 years respectively, and thewage is
simply the “OutsideWage”. Due to ASHE data limitations, outsidewages are constructed from the LFS between 2005 and 2009, using full timewages of 22–60 year olds at Local Authority
level. Controls variables from PLASC for 2008. In columns [5] and [6], the dependent variable is school performance, with wages and unemployment rates of 16–24 year olds at Local Au-
thority level taken from LFS. Controls in all regressions for Key Stage 2 (KS2), %Free School Means (FSM), %Male, %Severe Special Educational Needs (SEN) and Expenditure per pupil. Ro-
bust standard errors in parentheses (bootstrapped and clustered at the TTWA level in columns 1 and 2). * indicates signiﬁcant at 10% level, ** 5% level, * 1% level.
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In our model, one effect of wage regulation is that teachers leave
schools in high wage areas. This is likely to affect student performance
through a variety of routes: time will need to be spent by the senior
management team on recruitment rather than other activities, less
experienced teachers may be less effective (Dolton and Newson,
2003, provide UK evidence on this) and there may be spillovers on
the morale of the remaining teachers that may dampen effort
(Ronfeldt et al., 2011).
To look at this channel (which is essentially selection) we examine
the relationship between outside wages and teacher tenure in each
school.40We exploit a recently released data set, which presently covers
only 2010. We cannot, using these data, examine hires and separations,
but we can examine the association between average tenure in schools
in time bands and outside wages. We present the association between
the proportion of the teachers who have very short tenure (less than a
year in the school) and long tenure (over 10 years in the school) and
lagged outside wages, averaged over ﬁve years to replicate the model-
ling of wages in our baseline speciﬁcation.41We only have one observa-
tion per school so estimate Eq. (2) using LEA rather than school ﬁxed
effects, and report the results in Table 5, columns [3] and [4]. Column
[3] presents estimates of wages on short tenurewhile column [4] exam-
ines long tenure.
The results show that where outside wages are high, schools have
a higher proportion of teachers who have been in tenure less than
one year and a lower proportion of teachers who have been in tenure
for ten years only. The wage effect is little altered by controls for
pupil type.42 A £1000 increase in the outside wage results in a 0.2540 Ma et al. (2009) show a negative cross-sectional association between teacher vacan-
cies and local authority amenity adjusted wages for 2004–2007.
41 We use wage data from the LFS, averaging wages at LA level between 2005 and 2009
(we use full timewages of all 22–61 year olds in order to preserve sample sizes). Thewage
for each school is constructed as the average of all LAswhose HQ lieswithin a 30 km radius
of the school.
42 Wage coefﬁcients (se) without controls are 0.268 (0.040) and−0.45 (0.050) respec-
tively. Results are robust to the precise deﬁnition of the TTWA over whichwage is deﬁned
(results available from authors).percentage point increase in the proportion of teachers who have
been in the school less than a year, and a 0.43 percentage point de-
crease in the proportion of teachers who have been in the school
more than 10 years. While the magnitude of these effects is not
large (the coefﬁcients represent a 2% change for both short and
long tenure), schools in high wage areas lose teachers faster and
also have less experienced teachers.
5.3. A pupil or parental effect?
An alternative hypothesis is that our results are due to the re-
sponses of pupils and/or their parents to outside wages. The relation-
ship we ﬁnd could be driven by pupils responding to better labour
market opportunities by decreasing their effort at school because
they know there is an employment alternative. If this is the case,
we would expect to ﬁnd a negative relationship between school per-
formance and higher outside wages and/or the demand for youth la-
bour in the local labour market. To examine this we estimate the
relationship between school performance and the demand for
youth labour, as measured by local authority wages and, separately,
the unemployment rate, of 16–25 year olds, lagged one year.43 Re-
gressions are at school level and include the same controls as our
baseline speciﬁcation and school ﬁxed effects.
Table 5, column [5], presents the results for the association of
school performance and youth wage rates. Column [6] presents the
association with youth unemployment. Neither association is large
or statistically signiﬁcant. Further, for the negative relationship we
ﬁnd between outside wages and school performance to be driven
by a pupil response, pupils would have to be responding negatively
to positive outside wage or employment shocks. Whilst this is plau-
sible, it seems equally plausible that at least some pupils respond to
positive wage shocks by putting in more effort at school, on the
grounds that if they get better exam grades they are more likely to
get a (better) job. These plausibly heterogeneous responses do not43 We match Local Authority level NOMIS data into our PLASC dataset and include the
lagged employment rate in our regressions. As the pupils who are at the margin between
staying on and leaving are likely to be most affected by recent shocks, we use wages and
unemployment rates lagged one year.
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ability students (those at the 5 A*-C margin) and all students (total
exam points achieved).
An outside wage shock would also be a positive shock to parental
income, which could result in worse performance if greater parental
income means less supervision of children or more leisure time for
children. While we cannot rule this out, the lack of signiﬁcance of the
full timemale manual wages in the robustness checks in Section 4 brings
into doubt whether the effect is working through parental income. If pa-
rental income was important, it is not clear why a parental income effect
should operate only for parents in non-manual occupations. In addition,
the large (though often correlational) literature shows a positive rather
than a negative association between parental income and child attain-
ment. It thus seems less likely that the negative relationship we ﬁnd be-
tween outside wages and child attainment is driven by a parental effect.
School performance could affect outside wages, which would bias
our results. Themost obviousmechanism bywhich school performance
may affect outside wages is through sorting: good schools attract high
income parents to move into the area surrounding a school.44 This
would give a positive shock to the average outside wage and would
bias our estimated coefﬁcients upwards. However, the 30 km radius
TTWA we use weakens this argument. If we had used the catchment
area of a school to determine the outside wage this would be problem-
atic, as parents try to buy houses in the catchment areas of ‘good’
schools. But much of that gaming is within area. Individuals are likely
to choose areas based on their job and general lifestyle choice and
then select their speciﬁc within-area locations based on the schools
available. Fig. 2 shows a smaller relationship between outside wages
and school performance at radii of 10 km and at 20 km. The TTWA
radii at these distances give more weight to the local catchment area
round each school, whichmay indicate endogeneity at this smaller spa-
tial distance. Our analysis uses 30 km distance to avoid this problem.45
In summary, whilst these results are primarily descriptive as data lim-
itations mean they rely on more restrictive assumptions than our main
analyses, they suggest that the effect of shocks in outside wage on school
performance is, at least in part, through lower teaching quality and labour
supply and not from responses of parents and children to the local labour
market. In fact, whilst pupils (and their parents) might respond, they
probably do so in a way which biases our estimated coefﬁcients towards
zero.
6. Conclusions
This paper exploits the national regulation of teacher wages, nation-
al exams at entry into and exit from secondary (middle/high) schooling
and a national school inspection system in England to estimate the ef-
fect of teacher pay on school productivity. We ﬁnd that a larger gap be-
tween regulated pay and the outside labour market remuneration
reduces school performance as measured by student performance in
key exams and that the effect is larger where the ceiling imposed by
regulation bites harder and for schools that have no control over pay
and conditions at school level. At the average a 10% increase in the
local labour market wage would result in an average increase of 2% in
the scores attained in the high stake exams taken by pupils at the end
of compulsory schooling in England. But the effect in areas or schools
where the ceiling bites harder is around 30% higher.4644 English schools have pre-set catchment areas which deﬁne pupil eligibility to attend
the school.
45 In Fig. 2 the effect at 30 km is slightly larger than from our main regressions
(−0.980). In the main regressions we match schools to the nearest LA when there
is no LAwithin the 30 km radius. For Fig. 2 schools with no LAs within the given radius
are dropped.
46 We undertook simple calculations of the potential gain of removal of wage regulation.
These show a positive gain under a range of assumptions on key parameters. Results avail-
able from the authors.Lazear (2000) emphasises that incentives can affect perfor-
mance through both effort and sorting. The national set up of
the wage regulation in England means that both channels are like-
ly to operate. Wage regulation which keeps teacher relative wages
low in one (large) area of the country and high in other (large)
areas will encourage both effort reduction and mobility of
teachers to area where they get better relative remuneration for
the same job. Data constraints mean that we cannot trace through
all the pathways through which the pay effect operates but it
seems likely that both channels operate. We have shown that
school performance and direct measures of the quality, which
are important to schools under the ‘name and shame’ rating sys-
tem used at national level in England, are lower in schools
where regulation bites harder. This may reﬂect reduced effort of
the teachers in the schools but we also show that schools subject
to high outside wages relative to regulated pay also have higher
staff turnover, which may reﬂect movement of teachers away
from these areas.
Our ﬁndings support the view that teacher pay is important for
school performance. The recent focus of many governments has
been on using pay for performance for teachers (e.g. Lavy, 2009).
However, centralised pay setting affects teachers in many more
countries than are using pay for performance in the classroom.
Our ﬁndings suggest that policy effort could be usefully directed to-
wards increasing ﬂexibility in these centralised wage setting
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Table A1
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2010o. Exams Taken NPD 2002–2007N
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Outside Wage Regions
Panel A: High, Medium and Low Outside Wage RegionsGovernment Ofﬁce Region (GOR)N
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LA
LAAverage Wage, 2006 (£) Wage Regionorth East 29,092 Low
orkshire & the Humber 30,043 Low
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uth West 31,330 Medium
ast 34,105 Medium
uth East 37,223 High
ner London 37,248 High
uter London 49,484 Highanel B: Nominal Total Wage Increases by Outside Wage Region (£)rowth Period HW region MW Region LW Region997–2001 5220 3569 2327
(3568) (2298) (2864)002–2006 4381 3510 3716
(4420) (1980) (2154)997–2006 12,208 9490 8399
(4711) (2849) (2588)Source: ASHE. Standard deviations of wage growth are given in the parentheses. The top two rows of.
Panel B do not sum to the bottom row due to wage growth between 2001 and 2002.
Table A3
Descriptive StatisticsVariable Mean Standard Deviation Minimum Maximum Nariables Used in Main Regressions
ey Stage 4 Overall 44.08 10.18 14.86 99.01 5898Between 9.120 18.87 85.47
Within 4.530 25.52 62.65ey Stage 2 Overall 26.68 1.930 19.69 33.42 5898
Between 1.700 21.26 32.73
Within 0.920 24.23 29.13ve A*-C % Overall 0.565 0.192 0.048 1 5898
Between 0.175 0.126 1
Within 0.079 0.248 0.881verage Outside Wage (5 Years, log) Overall 7.134 0.161 6.651 7.615 5898
Between 0.113 6.845 7.489
Within 0.115 6.940 7.328side Wages (log) Overall 6.430 0.083 6.341 6.658 5898
Between 0.034 6.413 6.548
Within 0.075 6.319 6.540age gap (log) Overall 0.704 0.104 0.310 1.103 5898
Between 0.095 0.432 1.046
Within 0.042 0.582 0.826xpenditure Per Pupil (EPP) Overall 4.102 1.059 1.375 20.75 5898
Between 0.639 2.686 12.21
Within 0.844 −4.442 12.65ee School Meals (FSM) % Overall 0.132 0.126 0 0.89 5898
Between 0.123 0 0.875
Within 0.029 −0.052 0.317ale % Overall 0.506 0.189 0 1 5898
Between 0.186 0 1
Within 0.030 0.271 0.740ecial Educational Needs (SEN) % Overall 0.023 0.020 0 0.394 5898
Between 0.018 0 0.307
Within 0.010 −0.080 0.127ariables Used in Robustness Checks
verage Overall 9.132 1.071 1 15.04 5760
umber of Exams Between 0.896 5.252 12.89
ken Within 0.587 4.399 13.87
16-25 Unemployment Overall 0.078 0.021 0 0.207 14,825Between 0.014 0.025 0.129
Within 0.015 0.006 0.16916-25 Wages Overall 17,738 2809 9240 30,000 15,445
Between 2215 13,218 22,265
Within 1729 10,680 26,180(continued on next page)
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RMean Standard Deviation Minimum Maximum N25-49 Employment Overall 0.810 0.060 0.555 0.947 39,224
Between 0.052 0.628 0.901
Within 0.029 0.696 0.910FSTED Overall School Rating Overall 2.646 0.876 1 4 4919
Between 0.781 1 4
Within 0.500 0.851 4.146FSTED Teaching Quality Rating Overall 2.663 0.782 1 4 3397
Between 0.734 1 4
Within 0.383 1.597 3.996ariables with no within school variation
S Av. Wage (05–09) Overall 29,338 4396 21,369 53,368 3089
enure b1 yr Overall 0.113 0.083 0 1 2646
enure N10 yrs Overall 0.217 0.111 0 0.792 2646TTable A4
Test of Association between wage growth and student characteristicsFull sample High Outside Wage Region Medium Outside Wage Region Low Outside Wage Region[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8]S2 0.000 −0.001 0.000 −0.001 0.001 −0.002 −0.001 −0.004**
M 0.007 −0.010 0.030** 0.037* −0.012 −0.032 −0.012 −0.014
ale 0.002 0.003 −0.003 0.005 0.003 −0.017 0.004 −0.005
N −0.000 −0.033 0.026 0.049 0.015 −0.080 −0.058** −0.154**
Stat 0.347 0.559 2.583** 1.666 0.518 1.068 2.154* 4.355***(0.846) (0.692) (0.035) (0.155) (0.723) (0.371) (0.072) (0.002)
hool FE Yes
(3051)
Yes
(2987)Yes
(1159)Yes
(1130)Yes
(1105)Yes
(1085)Yes
(787)Yes
(772)ears 2002–2007 2002, 2007 2002–2007 2002, 2007 2002–2007 2002, 2007 2002–2007 2002, 2007
18,164 5974 6887 2260 6586 2170 4691 1544NRegressions at school level. All regressions contain year dummies. The F statistic is given for each regression, which jointly tests the signiﬁcance of the regressors in the regression of one
year lagged log outsidewage onKey Stage 2 (KS2), % eligible for free schoolmeals (FSM), %Male, %Pupilswith Special Educational Needs (SEN). P values for the F stats in parentheses.Wage
regions are determined based on growth rates of outside wages from 2002 to 2007. The HW region consists of the NorthWest, Yorkshire, Inner London and Outer London. TheMWwage
region is West Midlands, South East and East Midlands. The LW region is South West. North East and East. * indicates signiﬁcant at 10% level, ** at 5% level, *** at 1% level.Table A5
Test of Association between Baseline covariates and subsequent wage growth
Dependent variable: 5 year outside wage growthOverall HW Region MW Region LW Region[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] [12]Stat 1.013 0.465 1.711 0.665
(0.403) (0.761) (0.167) (0.620)ey Stage 4 0.000 0.001 0.002 0.010
(0.001) (0.015) (0.010) (0.016)A*-C −0.156 −0.439 −0.137 −0.164
(0.149) (0.313) (0.273) (0.156)A FE (148) No No Yes No No Yes No No Yes No No Yes
egion FE (10) Yes Yes No Yes Yes No Yes Yes No Yes Yes No148 149 260 50 50 94 47 48 78 51 51 88NRegressions at LEA level. The ﬁrst column for each set of regression gives the F statistic which jointly tests the signiﬁcance of the ﬁve baseline controls in a regression of outside wage
growth between 2002 and 2006 on %on free school means (FSM), %Male, %Severe special educational needs (SEN) and Expenditure per pupil in 2002. In the second column of each
set, wage growth is regressed on KS4 scores in 2002. In the third column for each set there are two observations per LEA, and wage growth (1997–2001 and 2002–2006) is regressed
on baseline 5 A*-C grades (1997 and 2002), with LEA ﬁxed effects. P values for robust standard errors in parentheses.* signiﬁcant at 10% level, ** 5% level, * 1% level.Appendix B. Supplementary data Barrow, L., Rouse, C.E., 2005. “Causality, Causality, Causality: The View of EducationSupplementary data to this article can be found online at http://dx.
doi.org/10.1016/j.jpubeco.2015.12.004.
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